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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
THE WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT: ITS EFFECT ON THE
OPERATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIIMITATIONS
B owes A $100. Will an acknowledgment in writing that the debt is
owed, by a statement such as "I owe you $100", containing no express
promise to pay, toll the statute of limitations? If so, is the time at
which the acknowledgment is made, i. e., before or after the statute
has once run, significant?
Williston states' that the unqualified acknowledgment in writing of
a present obligation to another, unaccompanied by any evidence show-
ing a determination not to pay, contains the tacit or implied expression
of a promise to pay; that a promise to pay is by implication of fact
a part of the acknowledgment and hence operates to toll the statute.2
This view, supported by case authority and accepted by the Restate-
ment of Contracts, appears to be the general rule.3 Williston points
out that it is an artificial inference of fact, but that the preponderance
of decisions has so held even though it is not made in respect to ac-
knowledgments of debt in related situations.' There are a few juris-
dictions which disregard the need of a promise, express or implied, and
follow the rule popular in Lord Mansfield's day, i. e., that the acknowl-
edgment, though implying no promise, is sufficient to toll the statute.'
The Washington Statute of Limitations reads in part:
"No acknowledgment or promise shall be sufficient evidence
'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 161, says it has ". . . been
recognized in England, and generally in the United States, that the effect
of an... acknowledgment is merely that of evidence of a promise implied
in fact. And if, taking all the circumstances into account, the admission
does not indicate an intention to pay, no liability arises from it."2What matters in the acknowledgment will, either by inclusion or
exclusion, defeat the implication of the promise are many. Most common
defects are that an acknowledgment is incomplete if the particular in-
debtedness is not defined or the amount left uncertain; that it is defeated
if there is a statement of refusal or inability to pay or is coupled with
a claim of set-off or reduction; and that it is insufficient if attended by
circumstances which deny the presence of a voluntary promise to pay.
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 86 states: ". . . unless other circum-
stances indicate a different intention: a voluntary acknowledgment to the
obligee, admitting the present existence of such an antecedent [contractual
or quasi-contractual] duty . . . [for the payment of money due from the
promisor]," "... is binding if the antecedent duty was once enforceable
by direct action, and . . .would be except for the effect of a statute of
limitations." 6 PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2nd ed. 1922) § 3492. See
also Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351 (U. S. 1828); Cosio v. Guerra, 67 Fla. 331,
65 So. 5 (1914); Pierce v. Seymour, 52 Wis. 272, 9 N. W. 71 (1881); Gilmour
v. Johnson, 254 Mass. 294, 150 N. E. 87 (1926).
'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 166. Custy v. Donlan, 159 Mass. 245, 34 N. E.
360 (1893), 38 Am. St. Rep. 422 (1894); Wooster v. Scorse, 16 Ariz. 11, 140
Pac. 819 (1914); Radigan v. Hughes, 84 Conn. 137, 79 AtI. 50 (1911); Free-
man v. Walker, 67 Ill. App. 309 (1896); Berryman v. Becker, 173 Mo. App.
346, 158 S. W. 899 (1913); Windom v. Howard, 86 Tex. 560, 26 S. W. 483(1894). Two common instances where the inference of a promise is not
raised from the acknowledgment are those existing after a discharge in
bankruptcy and after the discharge of a surety.
5Jenckes v. Rice, 119 Iowa 451, 93 N. W. 384 (1903); Disney v. Healy,
73 Kan. 326, 85 Pac. 287 (1906); Devereaux v. Henry, 16 Neb. 55, 19 N. W.
697 (1884); Cleland v. Hostetter, 13 N. M. 43, 79 Pac. 801 (1905); Andrew
v. Kennedy, 4 Okla. 625, 46 Pac. 485 (1896).
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of a new or continuing contract whereby to take the case out
of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained
in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby;
This section would seem to codify the general rule and to provide two
methods of avoiding the effect of the limitations statute-written ac-
knowledgment and written promise-without qualifying or restricting
the operation of either. Washington opinions, however, have been so
phrased as to create uncertainty in the law.
In Liberman v. Gurensky7 the defendant responded to a plea for
payment:
".... That little amount that I owe you will be paid some-
time. I don't know just how much it is. You say $1,000, but I
never could figure that much. I always thought that little
Harry paid that debt, but as he did not settle it I'll see into
it sometime."
The court found this to be an incomplete acknowledgment as the
amount due was uncertain and the time of payment not determined.
In addition it noted that the writing was fatally ambiguous in respect
to the designation of the person who would pay. But the court went
further than was necessary and said:
"A mere acknowledgment of the debt is not sufficient ...
to warrant the inference of a promise by the debtor to pay the
debt, and that the particular debt is unpaid."
This statement, taken literally, conflicts with RI. REv. STAT. § 176
and would seem to mean that in Washington only an express promise
to pay will be sufficient, unless "mere acknowledgment" signifies some-
thing different from "acknowledgment" as used in the statute.8 That
the court intended only to distinguish between forms of acknowledg-
ment, and not to hold all acknowledgments insufficient to toll the
statute of limitations seems to be indicated by Bank of Montreal V.
Guse,9 in which our court stated:
"... (the) acknowledgment must be clear and unequivocal
and made with reference to a particular debt which is subsist-
ing at the time. The acknowledgment must be so clear that a
promise to pay must necessarily be implied."
Here we have a definition of acknowledgment which approximates that
'REar. REV. STAT. § 176.
127 Wash. 410, 67 Pac. 998 (1902).
"That such a distinction was intended is probable. The opinion at page
418 reads, "A mere acknowledgment of the debt is not sufficient. The
acknowledgment must be in terms sufficient to warrant the inference of a
promise by the debtor to pay the debt, and that the particular debt is
unpaid."
951 Wash. 365, 98 Pac. 1127 (1909). In this case the plaintiff was the
holder by assignment of a number of defendant's notes which had been
barred by the statute. The plaintiff wrote four requests for payment dur-
ing a period of three months. In return he received three replies: the
first acknowledged the "contents" of plaintiff's first letter and asked plaintiff
to buy some property as "I could use a little money myself"; the second
claimed some credits upon the statement of account presented and asked
that plaintiff "explain matters more thoroughly"; the third disputed the
entry of a certain credit. From this correspondence the plaintiff asserted
that an acknowledgment arose.
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of other courts, not a denial of the general rule.
Coe v. Rosene,10 in chronological order the next case in point,
re-introduced uncertainty. The debtor's statement was, "Yes, I have
paid quite a few of the old losses, expect to pay more, and the next
one shall be to the family of my departed friend."" The court found
this too indefinite to revive the obligation, a conclusion with which it
is difficult to quarrel, but then went on to say:
"An expectation to pay, or a present intention to pay, can-
not be construed into a promise to pay . . . the law requires
more. It can be satisfied only with a distinct and clear promise
to pay ... We cannot find any words of promise in this letter.
It contains nothing more than an acknowledgment of the debt
and an expression of an intention to pay it, which.., is not
sufficient."
This language could be taken more readily than that of the Liberman
opinion to mean that our court would regard only an express promise
as tolling the statute; clearly it is in conflict with the wording of the
Guse decision. But in the next case which arose involving the issue,
Griffin v. Lear,2 the court said:
"If one in writing acknowledges he owes a debt, the law
will presume that he intends to pay it, unless there is some-
thing in the writing which shows a contrary intent."
This was followed by Tucker v. Guerrier3 in which the court re-
turned to the phraseology of Coe v. Rosene, that in order to remove the
bar of the Statute of Limitations,
"A new promise must be clear, distinct and unequivocal, as
well as certain and unambiguous. A mere acknowledgment of
a debt, or an expression of an intention to pay, is not suffi-
cient to revive the debt."
Though, as in the previous instances, this language was not essential
1166 Wash. 73, 118 Pac. 881 (1911), 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 577 (1912), 28 Ann.
Cas. 742 (1913). Strictly, this case is not in point for the debt was barred
by bankruptcy rather than by the statute of limitations. 1 WI.LISTON,
CONTRACTS § 158, points out that after bankruptcy an admission will not
operate as a new promise to pay the debt. See cases cited supra note 4,
which point out that the rule is contrary when the Statute of Limitations
is involved. The court did not note the distinction and has not distin-
guished it from the other opinions.
"Another statement was introduced in evidence: "... I advised your
brother . . . that circumstances had obliged me to discontinue sending
checks east; but that I held my promise to Cephas good, but do not know
when I can do what I want to." It adds nothing other than emphasis to
the contents of the statement mentioned.
"1123 Wash. 191, 212 Pac. 271 (1923). The court found a sufficient ac-
knowledgment in the statements, "I can only promise to pay the $1,600
with interest in some future time. You will never lose through me." And
"I am in no position to pay you now. I will say again you will never
lose through me . . . I will take care of your interests some way. I have
not denied that you gave me the $1,600."
1170 Wash. 165, 15 P. (2d) 936 (1932). Mr. Guerrier was indebted on a
timber account to the plaintiffs. They sent him an accounting which read
in part: "Jan. 10, 1922. 461,000 feet, $922.00. (Not Paid.) We hold the can-
celled checks covering item of $674.28 and also the 90 day note." His
response, which the plaintiffs sought to demonstrate as a sufficient ac-
knowledgment, was, "The above is correct statement of the Meredith
Timber a/c next time I am in the city will call on you."
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to the decision, for the statement relied upon was, patently an incom-
plete acknowledgment as it did not admit the personal indebtedness
of Guerrier and only with difficulty implied a promise to pay, its inclu-
sion operates to increase uncertainty.
The line of decisions is completed by Dolby v. Fisher.'4 On the
facts the court might have found that no acknowledgment was made
by the defendant. But again the opinion is so phrased as to make
uncertain the court's position with regard to acknowledgments. The
trial court instructed in part in the language of the Tucker case that:
"In order to remove the bar of the statute of limitations, a
new promise must be clear, distinct, unequivocal, certain and
unambiguous. A mere acknowledgment of a debt or an expres-
sion of an intention to pay is insufficient to revive the debt."
This was approved on appeal by the statement, "We think the instruc-
tion was a proper statement of the law, under the facts herein."
Can the apparent conflict in these cases be resolved by reference to
the time at which the alleged tolling occurred? It would seem not,
because, although the statute had run in the Liberman, Tucker and
Dolby cases, and not in the Griffin case, it had also run in the Guse
case, which accords in language with Griffin v. Lear.
The Washington cases seem to justify these observations:
1. In no decision has the court held insufficient an acknowledgment
clear enough to satisfy the general rule.
2. In the Liberman, Coe, Tucker and Dolby cases the court has
used, in holding the statute not tolled, language which is confusing and
which may induce future litigation.
3. If a clear and unequivocal acknowledgment will toll the statute
of limitations in this state, if Griffin v. Lear is to be followed, and if'
REr. REv. STAT. § 176 means what it appears to mean, the court might
be justified in so stating at the first opportunity.
4. And if this is the law, in future cases involving acknowledgments
bad because not clear and unequivocal, judgments for the defendants
might well be explained on that ground rather than by reiteration of
the statements made in Coe v. Rosene and Tucker v. Guerrier.
Is the time at which the acknowledgment is made, i. e., before or
after the statute has run, significant? Three possible approaches have
been taken: (1) An acknowledgment before the statute has run is in-
sufficient because the obligor should not be presumed to duplicate
binding promises to pay; (2) an acknowledgment after the statute has
run is insufficient because, as the obligation was no longer binding, a
promise can hardly inhere in the acknowledgment; and (3) an acknowl-
"1101 Wash. Dec. 159, 95 P. (2d) 369 (1939). The letters were long, but
the essential matter was to this effect: Dolby wrote, "From time to time
I have sent you itemized statements of your and his account of the balance
due on the two notes ... Now I want you to raise $250 for me and I will
give you credit on these notes . . . on which there is past due $524.78 as
above mentioned." Mr. Fisher answered, "I am in receipt of both of your
letters and I note what you have to say ... I am sorry I cannot help you
out at this time. But as soon as I can I will." The court pointed out
that this answer was ambiguous as it did not indicate whether he would
loan Mr. Dolby the amount asked or pay him such amount on the notes,
and was incomplete as it did not admit the accuracy of the amount Mr.
Dolby claimed.
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edgment is sufficient in either event for it carries an implied in fact
promise to pay regardless of the time made. The last view seems to
be the correct one in theory and it is supported by the weight of
authority.'5
Prior to Dolby v. Fisher all we have in point in Washington is a
statement in Liberman v. Gurensky to the effect that:
"An acknowledgment or promise made after the bar of the
statute creates a new contract."16
and a statement, largely dictum, in Griffin v. Lear:
"A writing acknowledging a debt which has already been
barred ought to be construed much more strictly than a
writing acknowledging a debt against which the statute has
not run. In the latter instance the original debt is acknowl-
edged and the action must be upon it... and... any acknowl-
edgment ought to necessarily infer an agreement to pay it,
unless there is something in the acknowledgment which leads
to a necessarily contrary conclusion. But where the acknowl-
edgment is made after the statute has already run . . . The
debt being barred, it is possible that one may acknowledge it
without intending to pay it." 17
The Griffin decision amplifies as well as qualifies the broad state-
ment made in the Liberman case, and suggests that an identical ac-
knowledgment would in one event carry an implied promise to pay,
and in the other, no promise.' 8 This approximates one of the alternate
views mentioned by Williston. 9
The issue was raised in the Dolby case. The court resolved the
matter by quoting the above statements from the earlier cases'0 and
saying:
"This court has recognized the distinction between ac-
'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 163; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 86 (1),
comment c.
"It will be recalled that the acknowledgment in this case was held
insufficient.
"As the obligation in this case had not yet been tolled by the statute
when the acknowledgment was made so much of the opinion as relates
to obligations barred by the statute must be regarded as dictum.
'"his excerpt might suggest that in either event an acknowledgment
would suffice but that the presumption of an implied promise would dis-
appear and the burden of showing such an implied promise would fall
upon the obligee in event the obligation had been tolled by the statute.
However, REM. REv. STAT. § 176 hardly supports such a concept and later
decisions have failed to develop it.
"There is in Tucker v. Guerrier the statement, "The mere acknowledg-
ment of a debt, or the expression of an intent to pay, is not sufficient to
revive the debt." This seems to support the view expressed by the Griffin
case unless the court abandoned the use of the technical meaning of
"revive," i. e., applicable only to obligations tolled by the statute, and
deemed it to apply to all obligations, whether or not the statute had run.
"The court has cited and apparently relied upon Sears v. Hicklin, 3 Colo.
App. 331, 33 Pac. 137 (1893), in each instance. While the opinion had
language favorable to the conclusion reached by the Washington court,
the decision held to the contrary. The Colorado court said, "The bar was
pleaded, and could only be overcome by a replication and proof of a new
promise, to take it out of the statute. It matters not whether the promise
is direct or legally implied or inferred from the fact of a partial payment
having been made."
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knowledgment of liability on notes and promises to pay same
made prior to the running of the statute of limitations and
promises made after the statute."
Since the court did not discuss the matter further, apparently the dic-
tum of Griffin v. Lear was approved and became the law of the case.
Our statute reads, "No acknowledgment . . . shall be sufficient
evidence of a new or continuing contract ... unless ... contained in
some writing . . . 21 While this does not expressly bring Washington
to any of the views outlined above, the use of "acknowledgment" in
equal application to "new" and "continuing" contracts strongly implies
our acceptance of the majority rule, for in the statute "new" seems
to mean a contract "revived" after being barred by the statute and
"continuing" seems to mean a contract yet "existing" (i. e., legally
enforceable) as the statute had not run when the tolling occurred,
No attention has been given by our court to this possible application of
RmE. Rav. STAT. § 176 to the problem.
Griffin v. Lear and Dolby v. Fisher left for settlement in future
cases the precise extent to which divergent tests of sufficiency will be
applied to acknowledgments before and after the period of limitations
has run. It may be that were the suggested meaning of Rxm~. REV. STAT.
§ 176 considered, it might have some effect in shaping the rule ulti-
mately adopted.
ARTHUR S. QUIGLEY.
REvL REV. STAT. § 176. Italics supplied.
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